The 2027 John Locke Theology question asks: "Whatever view you hold, the majority of people alive today appear to disagree with your particular beliefs about God. Do you know something they don't?" It is about the epistemology of disagreement, and its premise holds for atheists and agnostics too. Below are three readings to start with and the main arguments to weigh, from conciliationism (suspend judgement) to the exclusivist reply.
The question at a glance
| Category | Theology |
| Exact wording | "Whatever view you hold, the majority of people alive today appear to disagree with your particular beliefs about God. Do you know something they don't?" |
| Status | Reported from the Institute's October 2026 events; the Institute's website will carry the official list |
| Word limit | 2,000 words for the essay body, excluding endnotes and bibliography (2026 rules) |
| Who can enter | Any student under 19 on the submission deadline, from any country; under-15s are judged separately in the Junior category |
What the question is really asking
Start with the premise, because it is checkable. Pew Research Center's 2025 report on the global religious landscape found that in 2020 Christians were 28.8% of the world's population, Muslims 25.6%, the religiously unaffiliated 24.2%, Hindus 14.9% and Buddhists 4.1%. The largest group is still a minority. The unaffiliated category includes atheists, agnostics and people with no particular religion, so atheists alone are under a quarter. Whatever you believe about God, most people alive disagree with you. The question says so before you can object.
Three words in the question do most of the work.
"Particular" narrows the target. Belief that some God exists is a majority view; Christians and Muslims together are over half the world. But nobody believes in God in general. Once you specify (triune or not, personal or not, revealed in which scripture), you are in a minority. The question is aimed at the beliefs that make you a Christian, a Muslim, a Hindu or an atheist, not at bare theism.
"Appear" is a hedge. People who give different answers may not mean the same thing by "God", and survey labels can hide agreement. A good essay can use this, but should not rest on it.
"Know" raises the bar. The question does not ask whether you are reasonable or justified; it asks whether you know something. The essay has to decide whether it needs to clear that bar or can show why a lower one is the right one.
The live controversy is the one philosophers call peer disagreement. Conciliationists such as Richard Feldman argue that when equally informed and equally able people disagree, each should lower their confidence, or suspend judgement entirely. Steadfast views, defended in different forms by Thomas Kelly and Alvin Plantinga, hold that you may rationally keep your view, provided you have not simply ignored the other side. John Hick offers a third route: the traditions are not straightforwardly competing, because each is a culturally shaped response to the same ultimate reality.
There is a useful comparison with an earlier question. In 2023 the Institute asked: "If you cannot persuade your intelligent, sympathetic friends to embrace your religious belief system, do you have enough reason to believe what you believe?" Shivrav Sharma's second-prize answer, which we discuss in our analysis of the published winning essays, argued that "in matters of religious belief, those who disagree are almost never epistemic peers." The 2027 question changes two things. The dissenters are no longer a few intelligent friends but most of humanity. And the standard has gone up from "enough reason" to "know". Sharma's move works even better on the larger number, but it was built for the lower standard, and that is where a 2027 essay has to do new work.
The trap
The trap is answering only the headcount. It is easy to show that most of humanity are not your epistemic peers: most have never weighed the arguments you have, and religious allegiance largely follows birthplace. A strong student writes that section, feels the question is answered, and stops. But the real challenge does not depend on numbers. In every tradition, and among atheists, there are informed and fair-minded people who disagree with you as well. An essay that leaves them out has answered an easier question than the one set. The second trap is subtler. Suspending judgement does not get you out of the premise, because agnosticism is a minority view too.
Three core readings
1. Richard Feldman, "Reasonable Religious Disagreements"
Richard Feldman, "Reasonable Religious Disagreements", in Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life (Oxford University Press, 2007). Open copy: joelvelasco.net (PDF).
Feldman, who describes himself as a "complacent atheist", argues that epistemic peers who have shared their evidence cannot reasonably disagree. When it seems that they can, both should suspend judgement. He anticipates the best reply, that each side has a private insight the other lacks, and answers it with the line most essays on this question will need: "evidence of evidence is evidence." Knowing that a thoughtful opponent has an insight pointing the other way is itself a reason to doubt your own. Use him as the strongest opponent, whatever your conclusion. Note his own admission that he has not shown which religious disagreements fall into his category, because that is where a reply can start.
2. John Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism"
John Hick, "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism", Faith and Philosophy 14, no. 3 (1997): 277-285. Open access: place.asburyseminary.edu.
Hick argues that if religious experience is a good basis for belief, it is as good a basis for Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist belief as for Christian belief. So treating your own tradition as the single exception looks arbitrary. He presses the accident-of-birth point: most people hold the religion they were raised in. That fact, he says, does not show exclusive claims are unjustified, "but it does I think warn us to look critically at such claims." Use Hick for the pluralist answer, and also for an observation he does not draw out: if belief follows birthplace, the majority's headcount is less independent evidence than it looks.
3. Alvin Plantinga, "Ad Hick"
Alvin Plantinga, "Ad Hick", Faith and Philosophy 14, no. 3 (1997): 295-298. Open access: place.asburyseminary.edu.
This four-page reply is the most useful short text for this question. Plantinga accepts that people who disagree with him may be justified and that he cannot argue them out of it. He denies that this makes his belief arbitrary, since he thinks they lack something he has. Then he turns the argument round: Hick "differs from the vast bulk of the world's population" too, and must also think his opponents have a blind spot. He sums up his position in one line: "I am perhaps mistaken, but not arbitrary." Use it to show that the premise applies to every party, and then ask whether "epistemically fortunate" is something you can claim without saying what the fortune consists in. This is a reply to Hick's critique of Plantinga's longer essay "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism", which is worth reading if you can get it through a library.
Further reading: Thomas Kelly, "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement", Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1 (2005): 167-196 (PDF). It gives the standard definition of an epistemic peer, which Sharma's 2023 essay also used, and the classic steadfast thesis. Kelly James Clark, "Perils of Pluralism", Faith and Philosophy 14, no. 3 (1997): 303-320 (open access), is a reply to Hick from Plantinga's side. For the numbers, use Pew Research Center, How the Global Religious Landscape Changed From 2010 to 2020 (June 2025).
Arguments to think about
Each of these can carry a 2,000-word essay. Pick the one you can defend against its strongest objection, and make sure your essay answers that objection directly.
The steadfast answer: yes, in a limited sense
Anyone who holds a view about God, including the agnostic, must think they are better placed on the question than most people, because every view is a minority view. Against the raw headcount that can be justified: most people who disagree with you are not your epistemic peers (Kelly), and beliefs that track birthplace (Hick) are not independent testimony. Against informed dissenters in other traditions, what you can claim is reasonable belief, not knowledge.
The conciliationist answer: no, and that should change your mind
Follow Feldman all the way. Grant that the headcount is weak, then argue that informed disagreement on every side is enough to require suspending judgement on the particular claims of any tradition, while allowing a weaker, shared belief (for instance, that the question of God matters) to survive. The essay must then answer the charge that agnosticism is also a minority view, perhaps by arguing that suspension is a response to evidence about the disagreement rather than a rival belief about God.
The pluralist answer: they know something too
With Hick, argue that the traditions are not simply competing claims about one object but culturally shaped responses to a reality that none fully grasps. The disagreement is then less deep than it appears, which uses the question's "appear". The essay must meet the objection, which Hick quotes from William Alston, that most believers are "pre-Kantian" and take their beliefs to describe ultimate reality as it is, so that pluralism is itself a particular belief most of them reject. Kelly James Clark adds that Hick's account is neither the only nor the best explanation of religious diversity.
The reformed epistemology answer: yes, and you need not prove it
With Plantinga, argue that a belief can be warranted without arguments that would persuade others, and that being outnumbered is no defeater if one's belief-forming faculties are working as they should. The strongest version takes the parity point seriously: it must explain why the same defence is not available to every tradition at once. Clark's conclusion is a model of how to concede that it is.
You do not have to reveal your own beliefs to argue any of these, but you do have to say which kind of dissenter you are answering. For a mentor to test your argument before you draft, see our John Locke Essay Competition tutoring.
FAQ
Is the 2027 Theology question a good John Locke question to choose?
Yes, for a student who likes epistemology. The premise is checkable, the best literature is short and free to read, and the question rewards an essay that takes a clear position. It is a poor choice for a student who wants to defend a particular faith by its doctrines, because the judges are asking about knowledge and disagreement, not about which religion is true. Believers and non-believers can both write a winning essay on it.
What should I read for the "do you know something they don't" question?
Start with Plantinga's "Ad Hick" (four pages) and Hick's "The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism", both free in the 1997 Faith and Philosophy archive. Then read Feldman's "Reasonable Religious Disagreements" for the strongest case for suspending judgement, and Kelly's "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement" for the standard definition of an epistemic peer. Use Pew's 2025 global religious landscape report for the numbers.
Do I have to say what I believe about God?
No. The 2023 second-prize essay argued from the epistemology of disagreement rather than from faith, and that is the safer model. You can write in the first person, as the question invites, without declaring a religion: the argument should work for a reader of any faith or none. If your own experience is part of your evidence, say so, but then you must answer Feldman's point that your opponent's experience counts too.
How is this different from the 2023 Theology question about intelligent friends?
The 2023 question asked whether failing to persuade "intelligent, sympathetic friends" leaves you without "enough reason". Its dissenters were few and plausibly your peers. The 2027 question makes the dissenters most of humanity, which weakens the case that they are peers, but raises the standard from "enough reason" to "know". Sharma's 2023 argument that religious dissenters are rarely peers is a useful start, but on its own it does not answer the higher standard.
Related
The John Locke Theology questions page carries this question with its trap and argument lines, alongside the 2026 Theology questions for practice. All ten 2027 questions, with the expected dates, are in our John Locke Essay Competition 2027 questions tracker. Two related 2027 questions: do we choose what to believe (Psychology & Neuroscience) and is there anything wrong with posing or looking (Philosophy). For the standard the judges reward, read our analysis of the published past winning essays.
